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Introduction
Few topics in economics are not associated with cognitive ability. Cognitive ability shapes individuals' behavior, decision-making and performance outcomes (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010; Dohmen et al., 2010; Grinblatt et al., 2011) , and is a major determinant of individual earnings, income distribution and at the aggregate level economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008) . Ability considerations carry over naturally from individual settings to those involving teams of individuals: studies of team performance invariably emphasize the importance of individual team member abilities (e.g., Stewart, 2006) . Decision-making in organizations is increasingly performed by teams rather than by individuals (Hamilton et al., 2003; Woolley et al., 2010) . Consequently, the optimal composition of teams in terms of member abilities can be regarded as a valuable organizational asset. Yet, despite it being widely believed that (cognitive) abilities of members aect overall team performance, the precise impact of ability dispersion on team performance remains poorly understood (Hamilton et al., 2012) . Specically, we lack evidence about whether ability diversity of team members is or is not conducive to the performance of teams. Such evidence is potentially useful for managers seeking to select members of internal work teams, as well as being of interest in its own right. This paper examines the eect of the dispersion of cognitive ability (hereafter, just 'ability') on the performance of business teams in a eld experiment. We study teams of undergraduate students who are required to start up and manage a real company as a compulsory part of the curriculum in an international business program in the Netherlands. Companies are simultaneously founded on a level playing eld and students face strong incentives that align their interests with the business performance of their company. Our experiment randomizes 573 students into 49 teams conditional on their measured cognitive abilities. We ensure a relatively large exogenous variation in ability dispersion between teams to help probe non-linearities in the relationship between ability dispersion and team performance.
We believe there are two principal advantages of our empirical design. First, a eld experiment can establish a causal relationship between team composition and performance, in contrast to regression-based approaches in which members are free to self-select into and out of teams (Hansen et al., 2006) . Second, relative to prior empirical studies which have analyzed settings involving laboratory experiments (Woolley et al., 2010) , unskilled work tasks (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2003) , or competitive sports (Kahn, 2000) , our eld experiment closely resembles the functioning of teams co-operating on a complicated real business project. The case of business (management) teams is worth understanding well. These teams often exert considerable inuence on the performance of public and private organizations since they take decisions of strategic and operational importance.
Moreover, the tasks of these teams are often complex and broad in scope, entailing the sustained application of members' cognitive abilities. This is precisely the context of the eld experiment conducted in this paper.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. Team performance as measured in terms of sales, prots and prots per share rst increases at low levels of ability dispersion up to a maximum before decreasing at higher levels of dispersion. Controlling for the average cognitive ability of teams, performance is maximized at a coecient of variation in cognitive ability of approximately 0.25 (the sample average is 0.22). Teams of moderate ability dispersion also experience fewer dismissals during the program, although this does not chiey explain why those teams perform better.
Prior theorizing turns out to be unable to explain these results. Previous theories have highlighted benets to, or costs from, diversity predicting linear relationships between member ability diversity and team performance. Thus, if the inputs of members are complementary in team production, performance is maximized by matching individuals of similar abilities (Kremer, 1993) .
However, if members' inputs are substitutable, heterogeneous teams in terms of ability maximize performance (Prat, 2002) . 1 These arguments have been applied to explain performance in team sports, for example, Gould and Winter (2009) in the case of Major League Baseball, and Franck and Nüesch (2010) in the case of German professional soccer. Other reasons why teams might benet from heterogeneity in ability among their members include the imposition of valuable high team production norms by a few powerful able members and learning by less able from more able team members (Hamilton et al., 2003) . 2 In order to understand our results, we develop a novel model in which intra-team ability dispersion has both benecial and detrimental eects. Low levels of ability dispersion in the model are associated with smaller pools of knowledge and, hence, team outcomes of limited scope and value.
Greater dispersion is associated with larger pools of knowledge that produce more valuable team output, but this comes at an increasing cost. Team members can choose to shirk rather than provide eort, creating a free-riding incentive. Teams discourage shirking by monitoring their members; but the success of the monitoring technology is stochastic, decreasing with team member diversity. 3 At suciently high levels of ability dispersion, the probability of being caught and dismissed for shirking declines so much that shirking reduces team performance. Hence, moderate levels of ability dispersion in a team are associated with maximal team performance, i.e., the relationship between team performance and ability dispersion exhibits an inverse U-shaped pattern.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 outlines the context, design and data of our eld experiment. Section 4 presents the empirical ndings. Section 5 discusses and concludes. 1 In a model of conjunctive team production the lowest-ability member (i.e., the weakest link) in the extreme case determines team performance, whereas a model of disjunctive team production implies that ultimately the highestability member (i.e., the superstar) determines the performance of teams (see also Page, 2001, 2004; Iranzo et al., 2008; Rosen, 1981) .
2 Consistent with the predictions of their model, Hamilton et al. (2003) nd that teams' ability dispersion positively aects their output using high-frequency productivity data from a garment plant.
3 A related deterrence mechanism is peer monitoring. For an analysis of peer eects in the workplace, see Falk and Ichino (2006) , Kandel and Lazear (1992) , and Mas and Moretti (2009 
Set up
We commence by analyzing a two-member team, in which both members create value by combining their knowledge. Members have potentially dierent cognitive abilities, x i ∈ X and x j ∈ X, where X is the set of cognitive abilities in the general population. We have min{X} = x L and max{X} = x U > x L . Denote the average cognitive ability of the team byx = (x i + x j )/2 and the dierence between the two cognitive abilities by
There is a large number of teams in the population, whose total mass is unity. Decisions of one team do not aect other teams. Dierent teams may have dierent values of (x, d); our analysis will focus on only a single team.
People of given cognitive ability also have a given set of knowledge, denoted by {k} ⊂ K, where K is the set of knowledge in the general population. We assume that cognitive ability x and knowledge set {k} are related by a correspondence, whereby each element x of X is related via a map g to a given subset P (K) of K. Formally, g : X → P (K), where P (K) is known as the power set of K. To crystallize ideas in what follows we will work with the particular case where the power set associated with x is {x ± 1 2 ∆}, where
In this case, a unique and equally sized set of knowledge, spanning ∆ in size, is associated with each unique level of cognitive ability. For now, ∆ will be taken to be invariant to x. Later on, we will relax this assumption and allow ∆ = ∆(x), with ∆ (x) > 0, to encompass the possibility that more able people have larger knowledge sets than less able people.
Note that team members of low and high cognitive ability both have productive roles in this set-up. That is because both members possess unique knowledge. For example, a very able team member might possess detailed scientic knowledge about an invention, which the less able team member may lack. Yet, the less able member might possess knowledge about, e.g., salesmanship or market conditions, which the more able member lacks. Team members pool their knowledge: team value, v, therefore depends on the union of their (non-overlapping) knowledge sets. Thus, the value of a team is greater than that of a single team member, as long as x j = x i , i.e., as long as d > 0. Baumol and Strom (2010) describe how Matthew Boulton's knowledge of eighteenth century industrial market needs complemented James Watt's technical knowledge of steam engines and crank technology, forging a partnership that pioneered and disseminated the rotary-motion engines which powered the Industrial Revolution. As this example shows, the union of disparate knowledge generates value without either partner needing to acquire the knowledge possessed by the other (see also Lazear, 1999) .
If x i and x j are very similar, knowledge spans will overlap and the gains from being in a team are modest. Hence, rm value is greater the larger the ability dierence d as long as d < ∆. Once d ≥ ∆, rm value is no longer increasing in d since maximal knowledge pooling has occurred. Hence, the rm's value is increasing in v, where
See Figure 1 for an illustration of three dierent cases corresponding to (1). Note that none of the analysis or results that follow depend on the discontinuity of v(d) in (1): a smooth function for v(d)
which exhibits diminishing marginal returns to d would generate the same qualitative results.
Total rm value depends not only on v(d) but also on the eorts of both team members. Eort is privately costly for each member but is non-contractible and observable only by the member who exerts it: it cannot be credibly communicated or signaled to the co-member (e.g., Laont and Martimort, 2002) . Each of the member eorts are inputs into the production process. Each eort,
denoted by e i and e j for the two members, either takes a value of one (full eort, which incurs private and non-publicly-observed idiosyncratic eort costs of c i > 0 and c j > 0 respectively, where c i = c j in general) or zero (`shirking': no eort, so no eort cost). Eort costs are also private information, which cannot be credibly communicated or signaled to the co-member or a third party. The density function of eort costs in the population is γ(c) > 0 for c ≥ 0; the cumulative distribution function
Each team member chooses their eort given expectations (derived below) of the other member's eort. Total gross rm value isṼ
where f is an increasing function of both arguments. Without any important loss of generality, we will assume that f (e i , e j ) = e i + e j . Hence, f (0, 0) = 0: zero eort by both members yields zero expected rm value. The separability of the production function helps keep the decision-making separable at the individual level, which will enable us to study a game in pure strategies with a unique equilibrium. Let ω denote the outcome of a mean-zero random variableω (e.g., this could capture stochastic demand for the rm's output). Only the joint return e i + e j + ω is observed.
So while a member knows her own eort with certainty, she cannot infer the other eort once V is observed, since ω is also unobserved. This is important because it means that monitoring is the only way that members can measure the eort of co-members. At the outset, both members agree on the following contract: (a) realized rm value is equally shared at the end of the period if neither member is dismissed, and (b) any member who is discovered via monitoring to have supplied zero eort is dismissed from the team.
They receive zero output and pay a penalty of σ > 0. The remaining member takes the remaining output in its entirety. The reason for (a) is that costs and eorts are unobserved and output is a joint product: hence, an alternative ex ante compensation scheme based on eort-related equity shares is not feasible. For (b), dismissal in response to zero eort by the other member is optimal for the eort-providing member while providing an ex ante incentive for both members to exert costly eort. The penalty σ paid by a dismissed member could be lost capital or lost reputation, Illustration of three dierent cases corresponding to (1) 6 which detracts from their future expected economic prospects. The probability of dismissal will be derived endogenously below.
With probability p(d), monitoring reveals to a member any shirking by her co-member. Here, p is assumed to be a smooth and continuous function. Detection of shirking is assumed to be more dicult in teams where there is greater distance d between the members, reecting the diculty of disentangling eort from the productivity of that eort. 4 Hence, p (d) < 0, with p(0) = 1, p(∞) = 0 and p (d) > 0. We assume that the monitoring technology never falsely indicates shirking when eort was actually supplied. Monitoring is taken to be eortless and costless without loss of generality.
We do not study the determinants of team formation, taking (in accordance with our empirical data) the composition of teams to be exogenous. It is worth briey underlining the importance of assuming exogenous team composition. We want to predict how individual and team eorts, performance and dismissals vary with dierent amounts of team diversity. If instead we allowed for endogenous self-selection of diverse individuals into teams, we would only be able to analyze these relationships for that subset of team diversities associated with some given (assumed) self-selection process. We are interested in analyzing what could happen under a range of alternative sorting arrangements. Furthermore, the assumption of exogenous team assignment ts directly with our experimental design, which can therefore provide causal evidence about the consequences of a range of dierent team diversities.
Payos and optimal eort choices
Both members know d, but are symmetrically uninformed about the private eort costs faced by their co-members and, hence, the eort that their co-members will supply. They each believe with probability θ (derived below) that their co-member will exert high-eort and with probability 1 − θ that they will shirk. Expected payos under low and high eort by member j are
Evidently, j's optimal eort choice is given by
After rearranging and collecting terms, the condition for e * j = 1 is
We assume that the equilibrium strategy is the same for both members, i.e., an analogous expression to (6) exists for i (replace c j by c i on the LHS). Hence, we have a symmetric problem.
Member j knows her own c j but not c i ; i knows c i but not c j . While j does not know c i she does know the distribution of types, so her subjective probability that the inequality in (6) holds is
Dierentiate (7) to obtain:
The signs of these derivatives both make intuitive sense: a greater return from eort increases the probability that eort is exerted, as does a greater probability of being caught if one shirks.
Note that θ is xed for a given team (i.e., for a given d), though its value varies across teams with dierent values of d. Because the researcher does not observe each private eort choice either, we can state our rst proposition in terms of expected performance across dierent teams.
Proposition 1. Provided the eectiveness of monitoring does not decline too rapidly as members become innitesimally diverse, i.e., provided that
then expected team performance exhibits an inverse U-shaped relationship with the diversity of team member ability.
Proof. Both members provide eort with probability θ 2 , while only one member provides eort with probability 2 1 θ(1 − θ). Hence, expected rm performance and its derivative with respect to d, are
As shown above, the two derivatives (8) and (9) However, there is a limit to this benet of greater diversity; at suciently high levels of dispersion the probability of being caught and dismissed for shirking induces such low member eort that teams lose productivity and rm performance worsens.
The role of the condition in the body of Proposition 1 has a straightforward interpretation. If monitoring eectiveness declines very rapidly as members become marginally dierent from each other, then eort declines so rapidly that the ensuing decline in performance dominates any positive eect from greater knowledge pooling. Thus, if the condition in the proposition does not hold, rm performance will be strictly declining in d.
Dismissals
Next we ask which teams are most prone to dismissals of one member. In what follows, we will not pay attention to cases where both members end up dismissing each other (a case referred to as team collapse'). Indeed, there are no team collapses in the data to motivate such an analysis here.
We will instead focus on cases where only one member is dismissed.
A dismissal occurs if one member shirks and is caught while the co-member either does not shirk (or does and is not caught; if both members are caught shirking there is a team collapse instead). There are two ways the event`one member caught shirking' can occur, so the probability
The derivative with respect to d is
where
If (as is supported by the evidence in our study) less than half of all teams contain at least one detected shirker, then
A sucient condition for this to hold is 2Γ(∆+σ) > 1, which we will assume for the next proposition.
Proposition 2. A sucient condition for the incidence of dismissals to be a strictly decreasing function of diversity, d, is
If the inequality in (14) is reversed, and if in addition
then the incidence of dismissals is a U-shaped function of d.
Proof. Rearrange (13) to obtain
If (14) holds, then (16) is strictly negative. If (14) does not hold while (15) does, then the nal negative term of (16) (16) remains. This is positive if the inequality in (14) is reversed, proving the result.
The two possible dismissal proles outlined in Proposition 2 depend on the sensitivity of eort to the probability of detecting shirkers. If eort is relatively insensitive to the probability that shirkers are detected (i.e., if (14) holds) then the likelihood of dismissals decreases as knowledge pooling generates benets from eort (for low to moderate dispersion) and as the eectiveness at catching shirkers decreases (at high diversity). On the other hand, if eort is highly sensitive to the probability that shirkers are detected (i.e., if the inequality in (14) is reversed), and if the probability of detecting shirkers does not decrease too rapidly in response to a marginal increase in dispersion (condition (15)), then teams with low diversity supply more eort in response to benets from knowledge pooling leading to fewer dismissals initially. However, in more diverse teams where the marginal benets of pooling have attenuated, members supply so much less eort that, even though the probability of being detected has decreased, there are more culprits to catch and hence the incidence of dismissals rises.
A simple extension
The model can be extended to treat the case with more than two team members. A separate appendix, available on request, shows that it is possible to extend the analysis to this case, such that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to apply. An analytically simpler, but more far-reaching, extension allows cognitive ability to aect the size of knowledge sets. This possibility introduces a novel prediction, summarized in a new Proposition 3, below.
To model this extension, suppose
. Then the following equation replaces (1):
Teams' average cognitive abilityx qualies as a valid argument of (17) becausex is associated with greater x j and/or x i , which in all cases increases v. Taking this into account and using (2), the next proposition follows immediately. In contrast, a third-order term will be insignicantly dierent from zero if knowledge breadth is invariant to cognitive ability, as assumed to be the case in Proposition 1.
Second, Proposition 3 predicts the importance of including an additional explanatory variable in a model of team performance if knowledge breadth increases with cognitive ability: namely, the average cognitive ability of team members. In contrast, this explanatory variable will be insignicantly dierent from zero if knowledge breadth is invariant to cognitive ability, as assumed to be the case in Proposition 1. Like the signicance of the higher order term, this too is an easily testable prediction.
3 Context, design and data
Context
The teams in our eld experiment are teams of undergraduate students that have to start up and manage a real company as a compulsory part of the curriculum at the department of international business studies of the Amsterdam College of Applied Sciences. 5 The entrepreneurship program covers about one-fth of students' rst-year undergraduate curriculum. This program is organized in collaboration with Junior Achievement (JA), which is the worldwide leading provider of educational programs in entrepreneurship (Oosterbeek et al., 2010) . During the program students have to: raise capital by issuing shares; appoint ocers and delegate tasks; produce and market products or services; keep the accounts; and conduct shareholders' meetings. Hence, students execute a substantial and genuinely joint task that requires them to establish roles, build up relationships, and create routines and processes in order to maximize shareholder value. Moreover, students face strong incentives that align their interests with the business performance of the company (see subsection 3.2). Each company reports to their randomly assigned professor and business coach on a regular basis. Everything about the company is real, including tax and social security payments. The program is not a business simulation. In sum, students in our experiment have to coordinate on a broad array of complex decision-making tasks that entail the sustained application of their cognitive abilities.
Companies typically proceed as follows. They start with brainstorming about potential business activities and conducting market research to select the most viable idea. There are no restrictions on the type of business activity that can be chosen. Simultaneously, teams appoint about half of their members to management positions (such as the CEO and CFO) and the other half to nonmanagement positions, where management positions are redistributed among the non-managing part of the team halfway the program. 6 Companies further develop their chosen idea by writing a business plan, and they start raising capital by issuing shares. Other sources of nancing such as personal or outside loans are not allowed. Once the business plan is authorized by the majority of shareholders at the rst shareholders' meeting, business operations of teams boil down to production and marketing of the chosen products or services. All companies are dissolved at the end of the program and each team has to write an annual report that needs approval at the nal shareholders' meeting. Any prots are divided among the shareholders.
Our experiment randomizes 573 students into (a by the college predened number of) 49 teams conditional on their score in the 20-minute timed version of Raven's advanced progressive matrices test as a proxy for cognitive ability (Hamel and Schmittmann, 2006; Raven et al., 1998) . The average team size is equal to approximately 12 students. Table A1 in the appendix lists the key characteristics of all 49 teams, including the product or service they market.
Cognitive ability
Raven's advanced progressive matrices are extensively used to dierentiate between people of higher cognitive ability (Bors and Stokes, 1998; Mills et al., 1993; Raven et al., 1993) . The test requires subjects to select the missing gure out of eight possibilities that completes a logical pattern (see Figure A1 in the appendix for an example). Patterns become increasingly dicult as subjects progress. Over the past decades, Raven's advanced progressive matrices have been shown to associate with cognitive ability or intelligence in various ways. Elaborating on Spearman's notion of general cognitive ability (1927), Raven's advanced progressive matrices are found to measure uid intelligence (Cattell, 1963) , analytic intelligence (Carpenter et al., 1990) , and intellectual eciency if administered with a time limit (Hamel and Schmittmann, 2006) . 7 As such, test scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices can be interpreted as a proxy for cognitive ability. Indeed, the correlation between these test scores and students' grade point average (GPA) shows a signicant and positive relationship in our sample. Average and CV of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and coecient of variation in scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of cognitive ability at the team level (panel A) and by eld of study (panel B) . Panel A indicates that the average number of gures correctly solved in the 20-minute timed version of Raven's advanced progressive matrices test is 18.60 out of 36 gures at maximum. We do not transform these test scores into an intelligence quotient, because this would require an additional assumption about the proper norm for rst-year college students (Hamel and Schmittmann, 2006) . 8 Moreover, our main interest is in the exogenous variation in cognitive ability rather than the exact level of test scores. Consistent with recent empirical studies involving professional sports (Franck and Nüesch, 2010; Papps et al., 2011) , we use the coecient of variation in test scores as a scale-invariant measure for ability dispersion in teams. Teams' coecient of variation in test scores varies between 0.07 and 0.47 with a sample average of approximately 0.22.
Panel B shows the numbers of students and teams by eld of study. It also indicates that (the range of) average ability and ability dispersion of teams are similar across elds of study; possibly except for the eld of nancial management which accommodates only two teams.
Design
The cognitive ability of students and their background characteristics were administered one week before the start of the entrepreneurship program. 9 As outside researchers we then manipulated the ability composition of teams and randomly assigned students to teams in accordance with our imposed variation in cognitive ability. In practice, we proceeded as follows.
Within elds of study, students were divided into four quartiles per class on the basis of their test score, where 1 reects the best quartile and 4 the worst quartile. Each class was then split up in two teams, which received either treatment A or B. Treatment A combines cognitive ability quartiles 1+2 and 3+4, and treatment B combines cognitive ability quartiles 1+4 and 2+3 in a class. Hence, '1+2 teams' have a high average ability and a low ability dispersion, '3+4 teams' have a low average ability and a low ability dispersion, '1+4 teams' have a medium average ability and a high ability dispersion, and '2+3 teams' have a medium average ability and a low ability dispersion.
The assignment of students was implemented one week later by the program coordinators, who were informed about the character of our eld experiment. 10 Students and business coaches were uninformed, whereas professors only knew that a research project was performed that prohibited students to switch teams. Only 6 out of 573 students managed to switch teams during the program. Figure 2 shows frequency distributions of scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test at the individual and team level (average ability and ability dispersion). At the individual level test scores range from 7 to 32 gures correctly solved. The average ability of teams varies between test scores of 14 and 23, while as mentioned before teams' ability dispersion ranges from 0.07 to a coecient of variation in test scores of 0.47. We exploit this substantial and exogenous variation in cognitive ability to study the impact of teams' heterogeneity in cognitive ability.
One might worry that the eect of ability dispersion on team performance is biased since teams of low or high average ability, by construction, tend to have a lower ability dispersion (relative to teams of medium average ability). The scatter plot of teams' average ability and ability dispersion, school dropouts (which is highly unlikely for rst-year college students). Students with a test score 6 most likely just did not put in eort or choked while taking the test. T-tests acknowledge that those students are not signicantly dierent from students with a test score > 6 in terms of age, gender, risk aversion and GPA.
9 Students were kept uninformed about their score in the 20-minute timed version of Raven's advanced progressive matrices test. We presented the fact that they were tested as a standard procedure of the introductory week at their new college.
10 A few late applicants were randomly distributed among the existing teams whereas a few 'no shows' were also randomly distributed across teams (as they did not know to which team they were assigned to at that stage). Frequencies and scatter of scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test (individual and team level)
however, does not reveal a systematic pattern that may confound a causal interpretation of the eect of ability dispersion on the business performance of teams (see Figure 2) . Moreover, the results in section 4 are similar if we include only 31 medium-ability teams with average test scores not more than one standard deviation away from the average test score in the sample, i.e., with average test scores in the range of 18.60 ± 2.53 (see Table 1 ).
Dropout rates for rst-year students in Dutch higher vocational schools, where the admission of students based on grades or previous achievements is prohibited, are on average 30% including students that switch study and/or school (ref. HBO-raad, 2010) . The design of our experiment could be compromised if dropouts change the ability composition of teams. During the entrepreneurship program approximately 14% of the students dropped out or were dismissed, which reduced the average team size from 12 to 10 students. 11 Nevertheless, this did not considerably change teams' overall average ability and ability dispersion. The average ability of teams increased from a test score of 18.60 to 18.65, while teams' ability dispersion remained the same at a coecient of variation in test scores of 0.22. The correlations of teams' average ability and ability dispersion at the start and at the end of the program are 0.96 for both measures. Students in teams of dierent ability composition also did not drop out more or less often (dismissals will be discussed below). In sum,
we are condent that these composition dynamics did not compromise the design of our experiment.
Incentives
There are various strong incentives in place that align the interests of students with the business performance of their company. First and foremost, students can be dismissed in case of repetitive free-riding. 12 Dismissal of team members requires a two-third voting majority in the team together with the consent of the professor. It is a credible threat since the average number of dismissals is 0.35 per team and nearly 30% of the teams experiences at least one dismissal during the entrepreneurship program. Dismissal has severe consequences. Students are excluded from the program, lose its corresponding 12 credit points (out of 60 credit points in the rst year) and endanger their prospect of obtaining an undergraduate degree (for which a minimum number of 45 credit points in the rst year is mandatory). In section 4 we will examine to what extent dismissals vary across teams of dierent ability composition.
Another incentive is provided by the grade students obtain for the program from their professor, which has a substantial weight of 20% in their (rst-year) grade point average. Both individual and team performance determine the program grade and their weight in the total program grade is about 50/50 (assessment of both components is based on the professor's subjective evaluation). Individual performance of students mainly entails active participation and development of competencies such as cooperation, entrepreneurial behavior and professionalism. An indicator of the eect of individual performance is the considerable average dierence between the highest and lowest program grade 11 Lower dropout rates than the national average at the department of international business studies of the Amsterdam College of Applied Sciences can be explained by the fact that international programs generally attract more motivated students. 12 Interviews with program coordinators acknowledge that the main cause of dismissals is shirking of team members. gets some (local) press attention and represents the college in a national competition. All in all, the incentives discussed above ensure that students care about the business performance of their company.
Data
We accessed various data sources to collect information about individuals and teams. One week before the start of the entrepreneurship program students took the 20-minute timed version of Raven's advanced progressive matrices test and lled out a pretreatment questionnaire that mainly covered their background characteristics (response rate: 89%). Simultaneously, we received administrative data to assist us in assigning students to teams. At the end of the program, students lled out a posttreatment questionnaire that queried team characteristics and processes (response rate: 68%).
We then also obtained the approved annual reports, which contain information about the business performance of teams. The data that we collected were used to: construct exogenous variation in cognitive ability across teams (see subsection 3.2); test the predictions of our model (see section 4);
and assess whether the assignment of students to teams was random conditional on their cognitive ability (discussed in this subsection). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of individuals and teams. It shows that students are 20.9 years old on average and 43% of them are female. We also measure risk aversion (Dohmen et al., Table 2 indicates considerable variation in the number and incidence of dismissals across teams. Section 4 discusses whether dismissals vary in relation to the ability composition of teams.
Business performance is operationalized by four measures: sales, prots, a binary indicator for positive prots and prots per share. We include a binary indicator for positive prots to account for the fact that students tend to view as the bottom line result whether or not they are able to satisfy shareholders. Table 3 shows that average sales for all 49 teams are equal to 902 euros and that prots are 24 euros on average. More than half of the teams makes a prot (57%) and average prots per share amount to 0.62 euros. All three prot measures are signicantly and positively correlated with sales.
If we split the sample into teams of low (mean<17), moderate (17≥mean≤21) and high (mean>21) average ability, descriptive statistics suggest that teams of moderate average ability perform slightly better on the dierent business outcomes. However, note that these descriptives are very sensitive to the exact location of particularly the second cuto point. A cuto at a mean test score of 20 (instead of 21), for example, would already imply that teams of high average ability achieve better results. If we split up the sample in teams of low (CV<0.15), moderate (0.15≥CV≤0.30) and high (CV>0.30) ability dispersion, teams of moderate ability dispersion tend to have higher sales, prots and prots per share than teams in the other two categories, on average. This ranking is rather
insensitive to the precise location of the cuto points. The eect of the average level and dispersion of ability in teams will be examined more formally in section 4.
Randomization
To assess whether the assignment of students to teams was truly random (conditional on their cognitive ability), we regress background characteristics of low ability and high ability students on the average test score in their team, the team's coecient of variation in test scores and its square. This is consistent with the team level specications of the main results in section 4.
Panel A1 of Table 4 shows that background characteristics of low ability students do not systematically vary across teams of dierent ability composition. Hence, low ability students in teams of low ability dispersion are not signicantly dierent from low ability students in teams of high ability dispersion. The same holds for background characteristics of high ability students (see panel A2). Low ability and high ability students assigned to teams of distinct ability composition are also not more or less likely to follow a specic eld of study (not tabulated).
In a similar fashion, panel B of Table 4 examines at the team level whether (average) background characteristics of students correlate with the ability composition of teams. Again, there are no systematic dierences between teams of dierent ability composition. Note that the rst-year students in our sample have roughly similar capacities since they are all relatively young and all study at the department of international business studies of the Amsterdam College of Applied Sciences. 13 13 Since the randomization checks in this subsection fail to nd any pretreatment dierences (that may contaminate 
Sales ( Average and CV of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and coecient of variation in scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test. Average and CV of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and coecient of variation in scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test. In panels A1 and A2 each coecient comes from a regression at the individual level of the row variable on the column variables, separately for students of low (test score ≤ 18.60) and high (test score > 18.60) cognitive ability (robust standard errors in parentheses). In panel B each coecient comes from a regression at the team level of the row variable on the column variables (bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 1000 replications). ***/**/* denotes signicance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. 4 Results
Main ndings
The key prediction of our proposed model in section 2 is that team performance exhibits an inverse U-shaped relationship with ability dispersion. Another prediction of the model is that teams of moderate ability dispersion experience fewer dismissals due to fewer shirking members in those teams. This subsection presents the empirical ndings in the order of the propositions of section 2. Table 5 reports regression results for the eect of ability dispersion on business performance as measured in terms of sales, prots, a binary indicator for positive prots and prots per share (see Proposition 1). In panel A these performance measures are regressed on teams' average test score, their coecient of variation in test scores and its square (panel B provides results from spline functions). The linear eect of ability dispersion on business performance turns out insignicant in all specications (not tabulated). Besides standard OLS regression, we employ median and robust (M-estimation) regression to assess whether the results are sensitive to outliers.
the design of our eld experiment), the analyses in the next section do not include control variables (adding superuous controls would only reduce the degrees of freedom). Based on information from 49 teams. Average and CV of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and coecient of variation in scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test. OLS, Median and Robust refer to the estimation method. Median and robust specications for positive prots are excluded since this variable is dichotomous. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). ***/**/* denotes signicance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
20
21
Column (1) shows that, given teams' average ability, sales rst increase with ability dispersion up to a coecient of variation in test scores of approximately 0.25 (the sample average is 0.22) and then decrease with ability dispersion. However, columns (2) and (3) indicate that this eect of ability dispersion on sales tends to be inated by outliers: the point estimates are insignicant when using median and robust (M-estimation) regression estimation techniques. Columns (4) through (6) consistently show an inverse U-shaped pattern for the relationship between ability dispersion and prots. Again, performance is maximized at a coecient of variation in test scores of about 0.25.
The same holds for the probability of prots being positive in column (7), although the degree of ability dispersion where performance peaks marginally increases to a coecient of variation in test scores of 0.27. The coecients in columns (8) through (10) corroborate these ndings: the eect of ability dispersion on prots per share is described by an inverse U-shape with the optimum at a coecient of variation in test scores of roughly 0.25. The results from the quadratic specications in columns (4) through (10) are robust to outliers. Similar results are obtained when we exclude teams' average ability or include higher-order terms for the average ability of teams (not tabulated).
In panel B we estimate spline functions to address asymmetric eects of ability dispersion below Table 6 tests Proposition 2 by estimating the relationship between ability dispersion, dismissals and business performance. The number and incidence of dismissals reect respectively the number of dismissals per team and whether or not a team has experienced at least one dismissal (dummy = 1 if any). Panel A shows for both number and incidence that teams of moderate ability dispersion are characterized by fewer dismissals and, we infer, less free-riding. Dismissals do not reect a process whereby teams simply get rid of low ability or high ability students (rather than shirkers)
since the relationship between cognitive ability and probability of dismissal at the individual level is insignicant (not tabulated). Moreover, the number and incidence of dismissals are minimized at a coecient of variation in test scores of approximately 0.24. Note that this minimum almost exactly corresponds with the coecient of variation in test scores that maximizes business performance (about 0.25). Panel B indicates that fewer dismissals are also positively related to business performance, separately for number and incidence. However, we lack exogenous variation to identify (1000 replications). ***/**/* denotes signicance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
a causal impact of dismissals on business performance, since dismissals are obviously endogenous.
To test whether knowledge breadth increases with cognitive ability, we regress the dierent measures of business performance on a third-order term for ability dispersion (see Proposition 3). Its coecients turn out insignicant in all specications (not tabulated), which suggests that knowledge breadth is invariant to cognitive ability in our setting. This is a novel nding, which is corroborated by the (non-tabulated) insignicant point estimates for the average ability of team members. Similar insignicant results are obtained if we regress business performance on average ability and a third-order term for ability dispersion simultaneously (not tabulated).
Consistent with the predictions of our model, the results presented in this subsection show that team performance exhibits an inverse U-shaped relationship with ability dispersion. With average cognitive ability held constant, team performance is maximized at a coecient of variation in cognitive ability of approximately 0.25 (the sample average is 0.22). Teams of moderate ability dispersion also experience fewer dismissals during the program (i.e., lower degree of shirking members), although this does not chiey explain why those teams perform better. In contrast to empirical studies which have analyzed settings involving laboratory experiments (Woolley et al., 2010) , unskilled work tasks (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2003) , or competitive sports (Kahn, 2000) , we do not nd evidence that average cognitive ability of team members signicantly determines performance in a setting that requires coordination on a broad array of complex decision-making tasks entailing the sustained application of their cognitive abilities. Hence, our results suggest that (moderate) dispersion of cognitive ability trumps average cognitive ability in teams comprised of individuals of relatively high cognitive ability that have to complete a complicated business project (see Page, 2001, 2004) . We do not nd support for the notion that the lowest-ability member (i.e., the weakest link) or the highest-ability member (i.e., the superstar) in a team signicantly aect team performance (Kremer, 1993; Prat, 2002) . Results turn out being insignicant too when we relate teams' top 3 or bottom 3 students in terms of cognitive ability to the performance of teams.
Robustness
Robustness checks in this subsection are conducted by testing other measures of ability dispersion such as teams' standard deviation in ability (Hansen et al., 2006) , teams' ratio of the maximum to the minimum ability (Hamilton et al., 2003) , and spline functions with three segments of ability dispersion (cuto levels at a coecient of variation in test scores of 0.15 and 0.30).
Panels A and B of Table A2 in the appendix also reveal an inverse U-shaped eect of teams' standard deviation in ability and teams' ratio of the maximum to the minimum ability on their performance, although signicance levels vary across both measures of ability dispersion. 14 The degree of ability dispersion that maximizes team performance is again slightly above the sample average.
Panel C indicates a similar inverse U-shaped pattern for spline functions with teams of low, moderate and high ability dispersion (based on the coecient of variation in test scores). The point estimates for teams of low ability dispersion (CV<0.15) are positive and relatively large compared to the coecients for teams of moderate ability dispersion (0.15≥CV≤0.30). For teams of high ability dispersion (CV>0.30) the point estimates are negative and also relatively large in relation to those for teams of moderate ability dispersion. The number of teams, however, limits the precision of these estimates. In sum, none of the robustness checks are at odds with the results previously obtained.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Over the past decades, teams have become increasingly relevant for organizational decision making and performance (Hamilton et al., 2003; Woolley et al., 2010) . As a consequence, the composition of teams has become an interesting potential driver of organizational performance. We have studied the eect on organizational performance of a team's composition in terms of cognitive ability, a major determinant of economic behavior and outcomes (e.g., Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008) .
To this end, a eld experiment was conducted in which teams of undergraduate students start up and manage a real company under identical circumstances. Our experiment is likely to measure the causal eect of ability dispersion on team performance in a setting that closely resembles the functioning of business teams in the longer run (where tasks are diverse and involve complex decisionmaking).
We propose a model in which greater ability dispersion generates greater knowledge for a team, but also increases the costs of monitoring necessitated by moral hazard. In line with the predictions of our model, team performance exhibits an inverse U-shaped relationship with ability dispersion.
Controlling for the average cognitive ability of teams, performance is maximized at a coecient of variation in cognitive ability of about 0.25 (the sample average is 0.22). Teams of moderate ability dispersion also experience fewer dismissals due to a lower degree of free-riding members, although this does not chiey explain why those teams perform better.
There is ample opportunity to extend our model, for example, by allowing for richer interactions between team members. That might enable researchers to study other interesting questions such as preferences, beliefs and (re)negotiation in teams. Other limitations relate to the experimental set-up of our study. We exploit exogenous variation in cognitive ability among students who probably lack serious work experience, which may limit the external validity of our ndings.
Nevertheless, students in our experiment execute a substantial business project that requires coordination of a broad array of complex decision-making tasks entailing the sustained application of their cognitive abilities. Moreover, students face strong incentives that align their interests with those of the team. All in all, we therefore have grounds to believe that our eld experiment is informative about the impact of ability dispersion on the performance of business (management) teams. A next step for future research would be to replicate experiments like this, preferably in real organizations and on a larger scale. Average and CV of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and coecient of variation in scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test (excluding students whose test score is unknown). The number of students whose test score is unknown amounts to 60 (out of 573 students). Team size reects the size of teams at baseline. Missing or incomplete descriptions of a team's product or service are indicated by 'n/a' (not available).
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(8) Based on information from 49 teams. In panel A average and SD of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and standard deviation in scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test. In panel B average and ratio of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and ratio of the maximum to the minimum score on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test. In panel C average and CV of ability reect at the team level respectively average score and coecient of variation in scores on Raven's advanced progressive matrices test (with cutos at a coecient of variation in test scores of 0.15 and 0.30). OLS, Median and Robust refer to the estimation method. Median and robust specications for positive prots are excluded since this variable is dichotomous. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). ***/**/* denotes signicance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
